The growth in Federal funding of research and development that began during World War II has leveled off during the last decade, but the nation's need for continued expansion of effort in such areas as general technology development and industrial innovation has continued to grow. Foreign industries are increasingly able to compete in high technology areas previously dominated by domestic firms. As now constituted, research and support agencies such as the National Bureau of Standards are not able to respond to a call for new programs of greatly increased size and scope. For these reasons and others, a proposal is now before Congress to form a National Technology Foundation to include and expand the support missions of the National Bureau of Standards, the Patent and Trademark Office, the National Technical Information Service, and parts of the Engineering and Applied Science programs from the National Science Foundation. This proposal should be examined relative to the short term need for increasing the rate of industrial innovation and relative to a long term goal of integration of basic and applied interests in technology development.
The environment of power in which the optics research manager works has a significant influence on the formulation of programs and decisions regarding individual proposals for research. The concept of the government official surrounded by a wheel of power centers is applied to a typical Defense Department agency and the implications for contract decisions examined.
This paper is a case study of a research project in a government laboratory. It follows a protagonist through the inception, selling, and performance of a new field of research. A theoretical framework suggests how the case might be analyzed. The author's conclusion is that managers should establish thresholds at which corrective action is taken, rather than moving with small steps to failure.
Project management is a concept for managing complex one-time tasks. It provides a vehicle for centralizing management responsibility and accountability and may be used under a variety of circumstances. This paper looks at the conceptual basis of military project management, examines its appearance and how it operates organizationally, discusses the major relationships involved, and suggests several desirable personal characteristics of a military project manager.
The importance of information as a driving force in innovation is well established. The problem of providing interested users with access to information concerning inventions and technology development is a major issue which directly affects the innovation process. With these thoughts n iind, I would like to begin by briefly reviewing the elements of the patent document. Secondly, I would like to explore with you the various ways in which patent information may be used by public and private R&D managers to aid in the process of technology assessment and forecasting.
The field of electro-optic signal processing is growing at a rapid pace. Although many are involved technically, few are concentrating on where this growth will lead. This paper examines that neglected aspect. Technology growth patterns established by Project Hindsight are used as a guideline for a somewhat novel technique for trend correlation and extrapolation based on published paper title indices of electro-optics.
In the design and procurement of a high power laser system such as the Shiva Fusion Laser at LLNL, the optical components are the single most important aspect for optimum laser performance. The cost, schedule and quality of the optics are the driving parameters for the entire program and many factors are involved in controlling, monitoring and evaluating these parameters. These factors include 1) the procurement cycle, 2) knowledge of the vendors, 3) realistic specifications, 4) understanding of the fabrication process, and 5) the quality control and test requirements. Guidelines and examples of the methods used in the procurement and qualification of the optics in Shiva will be presented.
Optical engineering decisions on the MMT uroject ranged over the following: (a) choice of a telescope-cluster geometry for maintenance of low infrared emissivity and for structural compactness; (b) use of lightweight fused-silica honeycomb structure for primary mirrors, slumped to an f/2.7 curvature; (c) use of alt-azimuth geometry, which simplified mirror support; (d) interchangeable sets of all optics (except the primary mirrors) to provide optimum reflectivity at wavelengths 0.3-20 microns; (e) maintenance of image co-alignment by tilt and focus of secondary mirrors; (f) use of a laser system with beam expansion by means of an auxiliary focus-controlled telescope and persicopes, followed by retro-reflectors, to give reference beams for the telescopes.
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, numerous optical system programs have been carried from conception to operational status. Industry responsibilities include definition of and resolution of critical technology problems, development of conceptual designs for operational and support hardware, and finally, development and production of the operational hardware. This paper will discuss the role and the contributions of the management team in the evolution of three typical high technology optical programs. The first case study to be discussed is the role of management in a high-risk/high-payoff technology program, exemplified by the DARPA High Altitude Large Optics (HALO) Program. The second case study is based on Itek's involvement in the definition phases of the Space Tele-scope Program. The last case to be examined is the role of management in a major optical program directed at producing operational hardware in a timely, cost-effective manner.
During the timeframe from 1980 to the year 2000, optics technology and applications experiments will require spacecraft that yield the maximum benefit at minimum cost. Current NASA plans include Spacelab, Power Extension Package (PEP), 25 kW Power System (PS), and a Science Applications and Space Platform (SASP), to satisfy the user needs in low earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO). The purpose of this paper is to acquaint the optics technology user with NASA planning applicable to their future needs. This paper identifies current NASA concepts, including Spacelab hardware, that can be utilized to achieve a broad spectrum of optics scientific and application missions. Evolving configurations of Spacelab hardware elements will be shown that can be utilized as an orbital test platform in LEO and GEO. The orbital test platform concept allows the optics user to test their instrument on nominal Spacelab/Orbiter seven-day missions, and if everything works as planned, use the same instrument, with identical Spacelab interfaces, on 30-day and longer duration missions. This concept will reduce the cost of testing optics instruments by thoroughly testing the total system, i.e., instrument, interfaces, and ground and mission operations, before committing a very costly instrument to a long duration mission. Taking into account the long lead times required to design, develop, and deliver experiment hardware, now is the time to begin planning optics experiments and payloads that take advantage of the unique capabilities described in this paper.
The IR&D conducted by profit-oriented industrial organizations involved in defense related work is applied research directed at the anticipated near-term needs of the customer community. The conduct of the basic research is left to the Government laboratories and the universities that work under direct contract to the Government. Working under this guideline, the managers of optics IR&D must strike a balance between improving our basic technical skills, which will enable us to perform more effectively for our customers in the future, and developing new or improved techniques and capabilities to address the upcoming requirements of the customer community. This paper discusses IR&D organization within an industrial concern, and explores how IR&D management identifies a future hardware requirement and subsequently plans, staffs, and executes near-term improvements in the art of optics through a series of continuing programs. The example used to illustrate the management of an optics IR&D effort is a series of ongoing IR&D programs at Itek aimed at the development of advanced techniques for light-weighting glassy optical components.
There is a technique for successfully getting optics through the shop. It involves paying attention to details and knowing at least as much about the fabrication process as the people doing the work. By being smarter than the others involved in the fabrication process, we do not mean that you necessarily must be familiar with the craft side of the work, but that you should be aware of each of the necessary steps in fabrication so that you can ask intelligent questions about what is going on at any given time. Further, you should be aware of a greater part of the process than the people in the shop and thus be smarter by having a better overall view of the procedures beginning with calculations and ending with hardware.
Successful development of a high performance airborne camera requires effective program management. Critical factors essential to successful program management are discussed, with emphasis on the planning and implementation of the program plan. Activities are described that were essential to the management of the development and manufacture of a 72-in. focal length panoramic camera designed for long range oblique photographic (LOROP) missions.
The steps necessary in the formulation of a major NASA project leading to project approval are discussed. Emphasis is placed on certain unique aspects of managing the definition of optical system payloads. The approach of establishing a baseline configuration and doing engineering trade studies utilizing this baseline is described. The strong interdependence of subsystems in a precision, complex optical system is discussed, and the necessity of establishing a systems error budget is emphasized. Initially, it was planned to trace through the various steps of the Space Telescope definition, but a more general approach was decided upon. A new Federal procurement policy that affects the definition of NASA programs has been established and the principal features of this policy are described. Also, certain aspects of the definition of the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF) are discussed. The AXAF is a large X-ray observatory, similar in size and concept of operation to the Space Telescope; however, it operates in the X-ray region of the spectrum and has grazing incidence optics.
I will give a somewhat historical summary of how we have handled the science management on Space Telescope. The Space Telescope has gone by different names at different times and we'll give some of that history. I should make it clear that science management is not to be confused with management of scientists, which is something about which I defy anyone to give a formal talk. Just remember that Space Telescope is now, as it was always intended to be, a user's telescope. A point that Jim Downey made in his paper - you always have to be sure you have a customer. In this case, the customer was there first - even before the agency. The intent in the way we have handled science management on Space Telescope has always been to be responsive and cooperative. We can contrast this with numerous other programs, including some of those done by NASA, where the intent was to do a program, to build something, to go to the moon, to develop a facility, and then find a customer. Often this comes back and bites you. The time scale of the backlash varies from months, years, to decades, but it's there and it's something that all agencies need to bear in mind.
A key systems engineering tool in the management of the Space Telescope is the use of error budget "margins", or resource reserves, which are put aside and used subsequently either to lower cost or alleviate unforeseen problems. Most margins are used during the design process to act as a resource pool from which to draw in resolving unforeseen technical difficulties or in avoiding cost growth. These error budgets and their margins become the central element in the evolution of a sophisticated space optical system from concept to application. This paper illustrates this by examples drawn from Perkin-Elmer's recent experience with the Space Telescope.
In this talk, I will discuss some of the history and unique aspects of the optics development for HEAO-B, mention some of the results of the program to illustrate its success, and, finally, give some thoughts for future large scientific programs of this type.
American Science and Engineering, Inc. designed the large X-ray optic for the HEAO-2 X-Ray Telescope. The fabrication of the optical surfaces, their assembly and alignment were subcontracted to Perkin-Elmer by AS&E. The HEAO-2 mirror was truly one of a kind, nothing like it has been built before. There was no prototype, no spare optical surfaces -- the one mirror assembly we built would fly. With the ambitious performance goals of HEAP so intensely dependent on the mirror, this subcontract was recognized from the beginning as key to the success of the program. Also, since X-ray optical performance could not be measured until 6 months after delivery, unusual in-process controls had to be placed on P-E throughout the subcontract to assure success. Management of this effort was extremely complex because of the intricate weaving of the responsibilities between the two companies and the close surveillance and participation by NASA and the Principal Investigator. This paper will describe the Yanagement Plan used to accomplish this program and the many revisions to that plan required as this unique state-of-the-art effort unfolded.
This paper discusses the management of optical projects from the concept stage, beginning with system specifications, through design, optical fabrication and test tasks. Special emphasis is placed on effective coupling of design engineering with fabrication development and utilization of available technology. Contrasts are drawn between accepted formalized management techniques, the realities of dealing with fragile components and the necessity of an effective project team which integrates the special characteristics of highly skilled optical specialists including lens designers, optical engineers, opticians, and metrologists. Examples are drawn from the HEAO-2 X-Ray Telescope and Space Telescope projects.