The inherent nature of unattended sensors makes these devices most vulnerable to detection, exploitation, and denial in contested environments. Physical access is often cited as the easiest way to compromise any device or network. A new mechanism for mitigating these types of attacks developed under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, ASD(R and E) project, “Smoke Screen in Cyberspace”, was demonstrated in a live, over-the-air experiment. Smoke Screen encrypts, slices up, and disburses redundant fragments of files throughout the network. Recovery is only possible after recovering all fragments and attacking/denying one or more nodes does not limit the availability of other fragment copies in the network. This experiment proved the feasibility of redundant file fragmentation, and is the foundation for developing sophisticated methods to blacklist compromised nodes, move data fragments from risks of compromise, and forward stored data fragments closer to the anticipated retrieval point. This paper outlines initial results in scalability of node members, fragment size, file size, and performance in a heterogeneous network consisting of the Wireless Network after Next (WNaN) radio and Common Sensor Radio (CSR).