Paper
8 February 2005 Congestion pricing by priority auction
Guanxiang Zhang, Jianhua He, Yajie Ma, Wenqing Cheng, Zongkai Yang
Author Affiliations +
Abstract
This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of “cμ-rule”. Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.
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Guanxiang Zhang, Jianhua He, Yajie Ma, Wenqing Cheng, and Zongkai Yang "Congestion pricing by priority auction", Proc. SPIE 5626, Network Architectures, Management, and Applications II, (8 February 2005); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.577065
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KEYWORDS
Actinium

Warfare

Networks

Internet

Network security

Computer networks

Communication engineering

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