5 January 2008 Dynamic prisoner's dilemma on scale-free network
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In this paper, we study the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) on a scale-free social network where the agents participate the game with a probability proportional to the power of their degree, i.e., Pi ~ kαi. In this way, the agents' participation in the game change with time, and our study reveals some properties of PDG in a dynamic social structure. In the generations each active player updates its strategy by following one of the active neighbors' strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. Simulation shows the dynamic attending of agents has an important effect on the evolutionary game. In order to enhance cooperation behavior, we need to constrain participant of low-degree agents and encourage participant of high-degree agents in the game. In most cases, a maximum cooperation frequency is achieved when α is set to be slightly higher than zero. Our study may also shed some light on the policy construction of government.
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Mao-Bin Hu, Mao-Bin Hu, Yong-Hong Wu, Yong-Hong Wu, Rui Jiang, Rui Jiang, Qing-Song Wu, Qing-Song Wu, "Dynamic prisoner's dilemma on scale-free network", Proc. SPIE 6802, Complex Systems II, 680217 (5 January 2008); doi: 10.1117/12.769770; https://doi.org/10.1117/12.769770

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