18 June 2012 Exploiting exploration strategies in repeated normal form security games
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Abstract
We describe a method for the estimation of an opponent's utility matrix in a finite repeated game, given that he selects his actions by a known deterministic algorithm with some unknown parameters. We also investigate the prediction, based on the utility matrix estimate, of this opponent's future actions, and a simple method by which the opponent can counter these efforts. These are posed as a feasibility problem and a convex optimization problem, respectively. Simulation results are also presented.
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James Thomas House, James Thomas House, George Cybenko, George Cybenko, } "Exploiting exploration strategies in repeated normal form security games", Proc. SPIE 8359, Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense XI, 835907 (18 June 2012); doi: 10.1117/12.924760; https://doi.org/10.1117/12.924760
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