Stable structures of coalitions in competitive and altruistic military teams

M. Aurangzeb; D. Mikulski; G. Hudas; F. L. Lewis; Edward Gu

doi:10.1117/12.2014391

17 May 2013 Stable structures of coalitions in competitive and altruistic military teams

M. Aurangzeb, D. Mikulski, G. Hudas, F. L. Lewis, Edward Gu

Proceedings Volume 8741, Unmanned Systems Technology XV; 87410L (2013) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2014391
Event: SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing, 2013, Baltimore, Maryland, United States

Abstract

In heterogeneous battlefield teams, the balance between team and individual objectives forms the basis for the internal topological structure of teams. The stability of team structure is studied by presenting a graphical coalitional game (GCG) with Positional Advantage (PA). PA is Shapley value strengthened by the Axioms of value. The notion of team and individual objectives is studied by defining altruistic and competitive contribution made by an individual; altruistic and competitive contributions made by an agent are components of its total or marginal contribution. Moreover, the paper examines dynamic team effects by defining three online sequential decision games based on marginal, competitive and altruistic contributions of the individuals towards team. The stable graphs under these sequential decision games are studied and found to be structurally connected, complete, or tree respectively.

Citation Download Citation

M. Aurangzeb, D. Mikulski, G. Hudas, F. L. Lewis, and Edward Gu "Stable structures of coalitions in competitive and altruistic military teams", Proc. SPIE 8741, Unmanned Systems Technology XV, 87410L (17 May 2013); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2014391

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