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13 October 2015Establishing security of quantum key distribution without monitoring disturbance
In conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, the information leak to an eavesdropper is estimated through
the basic principle of quantum mechanics dictated in the original version of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. The
amount of leaked information on a shared sifted key is bounded from above essentially by using information-disturbance
trade-off relations, based on the amount of signal disturbance measured via randomly sampled or inserted probe signals.
Here we discuss an entirely different avenue toward the private communication, which does not rely on the information disturbance
trade-off relations and hence does not require a monitoring of signal disturbance. The independence of the
amount of privacy amplification from that of disturbance tends to give it a high tolerance on the channel noises. The
lifting of the burden of precise statistical estimation of disturbance leads to a favorable finite-key-size effect. A protocol
based on the novel principle can be implemented by only using photon detectors and classical optics tools: a laser, a
phase modulator, and an interferometer. The protocol resembles the differential-phase-shift QKD protocol in that both
share a simple binary phase shift keying on a coherent train of weak pulses from a laser. The difference lies in the use of
a variable-delay interferometer in the new protocol, which randomly changes the combination of pulse pairs to be
superposed. This extra randomness has turned out to be enough to upper-bound the information extracted by the
eavesdropper, regardless of how they have disturbed the quantum signal.
Masato Koashi
"Establishing security of quantum key distribution without monitoring disturbance", Proc. SPIE 9648, Electro-Optical and Infrared Systems: Technology and Applications XII; and Quantum Information Science and Technology, 96480Y (13 October 2015); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2197813
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Masato Koashi, "Establishing security of quantum key distribution without monitoring disturbance," Proc. SPIE 9648, Electro-Optical and Infrared Systems: Technology and Applications XII; and Quantum Information Science and Technology, 96480Y (13 October 2015); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2197813