In the late 1980s, Aharonov and colleagues developed the notion of a weak measurement of a quantum observable that does not appreciably disturb the system.1, 2 The measurement results are conditioned on both the pre-selected and post-selected state of the quantum system. While any one measurement reveals very little information, by making the same measurement on a large ensemble of identically prepared pre- and post-selected (PPS) states and averaging the results, one may obtain what is known as the weak value of the observable with respect to that PPS ensemble. Recently, weak measurements have been proposed as a method of assessing the security of QKD in the well-known BB84 protocol.3 This weak value augmented QKD protocol (WV-QKD) works by additionally requiring the receiver, Bob, to make a weak measurement of a particular observable prior to his strong measurement. For the subset of measurement results in which Alice and Bob's measurement bases do not agree, the weak measurement results can be used to detect any attempt by an eavesdropper, Eve, to correlate her measurement results with Bob's. Furthermore, the well-known detector blinding attacks, which are known to perfectly correlate Eve's results with Bob's without being caught by conventional BB84 implementations, actually make the eavesdropper more visible in the new WV-QKD protocol. In this paper, we will introduce the WV-QKD protocol and discuss its generalization to the 6-state single qubit protocol. We will discuss the types of weak measurements that are optimal for this protocol, and compare the predicted performance of the 6- and 4-state WV-QKD protocols.
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Jacob M. Farinholt, James E. Troupe, "Enhancing QKD security with weak measurements," Proc. SPIE 9996, Quantum Information Science and Technology II, 99960B (24 October 2016);