Dr. Gregory Ditzler Profile

Dr. Gregory Ditzler

Associate Professor at Rowan Univ

SPIE Involvement:

Author

Area of Expertise:

machine learning , neural networks , deep learning , computer vision

Websites:

Personal Website | Company Website

Publications (2)

Proceedings Article | 14 June 2023 Presentation + Paper

DyViR: dynamic virtual reality dataset for aerial threat object detection

Garrett Williams, George Lecakes, Amanda Almon, Nikolas Koutsoubis, Kyle Naddeo, Thomas Kiel, Gregory Ditzler, Nidhal Bouaynaya

Proceedings Volume 12529, 125290G (2023) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2663417

KEYWORDS: Data modeling, Unmanned aerial vehicles, Object detection, Education and training, Video, 3D modeling, Machine learning, Virtual reality, Performance modeling, Visualization

Read Abstract +

Proceedings Article | 6 June 2022 Presentation + Paper

Application of adversarial machine learning in protocol and modulation misclassification

Marwan Krunz, Wenhan Zhang, Gregory Ditzler

Proceedings Volume 12113, 121131J (2022) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2619523

KEYWORDS: Modulation, Neural networks, Machine learning, Transmitters, Signal to noise ratio, Defense and security, Wireless communications, Signal generators

Read Abstract +

This paper explores the application of adversarial machine learning (AML) in RF communications, and more specifically the impact of intelligently crafted AML perturbations on the accuracy of deep neural network (DNN) based technology (protocol) and modulation-scheme classifiers. For protocol classification, we consider multiple heterogeneous wireless technologies that operate over shared spectrum, exemplified by the coexistence of Wi-Fi, LTE LAA (Licensed Assisted Access), and 5G NR-Unlicensed (5G NR-U) devices in the unlicensed 5 GHz bands. Time-interleaving-based spectrum sharing is assumed. Given a window of received I/Q samples, a legitimate DNN-based classifier (called the defender’s classifier ) is often used to identify the underlying protocol/technology. Similarly, DNN classifiers are often used to discern the underlying modulation scheme. For both types of classifiers, we study an attack model in which an adversarial device eavesdrops on ongoing transmissions and uses its own attacker’s classifier to generate low-power AML perturbations that significantly degrade the accuracy of the defender’s classifier. We consider several DNN architectures for protocol and modulation classification (based on recurrent and convolutional neural networks) that normally exhibit high classification accuracy under random noise (i.e., AWGN). By applying AML-generated perturbations, we show how the accuracy of these classifiers degrades significantly, even when the signal-to-perturbation ratio (SPR) is high. Several attack vectors are formulated, depending on how much knowledge the attacker has of the defender’s classifier. On the one extreme, we study a “white-box” attack, whereby the attacker has complete knowledge of the defender’s classifier and its training dataset. We gradually relax this assuming, ultimately considering an almost “black-box” attack. Mitigation techniques based on AML training are presented and are shown to help in countering AML attacks.

View contact details

UPDATE YOUR PROFILE

Is this your profile? Update it now.

Sign into your SPIE.org account

Don’t have a profile and want one?

Create an account on SPIE.org

Keywords/Phrases

Search In:

Publication Years