The twentieth century saw the armies of the US and the UK successfully meet a number of extreme demands imposed by changes in weapons technology and by politico-military events. In many cases, on both sides of the Atlantic, this has demanded a greater or lesser transformation of military organisation and practice.
The present paper attempts a broad conspectus of the reactions of both armies to the most significant of these technological challenges, such as the magazine rifle, war gases, the tank, indirect-fire artillery, radio control, the atomic bomb, the guided missile and the digital computer.
It seems that the US Army has been much more prepared than the British to re-organise itself to meet technological change. The British Army not only seems to have transformed itself less often, but also as a response to pressures other than those of technology.
The author concludes that there are certain principles that have held good throughout a century of sometimes dizzying technological change, and which will be worth holding on to. The force transformation we see may not be entirely the one we expect.