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This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in finite dynamic scale-free networks, where
the dynamic property is fulfilled by considering an epidemic process in networks. When a person is in infected
state, he will not play PDG. Only healthy persons play PDG with their healthy neighbors. Our simulations show
that (i) the ratio of healthy persons, Rs, depends not only on the spreading rate λ, but also on the recovery
rate δ; (ii) The relationship between cooperation behaviors and the spreading rate λ depends on the value of δ;
(iii) Given the same value of Rs and payoff parameter b, the cooperation frequency f changes with δ; (iv) Some
curves of f against Rs are monotonic while others are non-monotonic. We have qualitatively explained results
(ii)-(iv) through competition mechanism of cooperation enhancement effect and cooperation suppression effect.
Our work sheds some lights on the important effect of dynamic topology on evolutionary game.
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